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1 Introduction
There is a growing interest within labor economics in the effect of macroeconomic
conditions on microeconomic outcomes. In particular, recent studies have found a
substantial and persistent negative impact of recessions on individuals’ employment
and earnings.1 Yet, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study which examines
whether individuals react to these recession shocks in terms of occupational choice and
the potential impact the reaction might have on talent allocation and productivity
across sectors. Our paper fills this gap in the literature by looking at a specific market
where individual skills can readily be measured—academia.
We study the impact of the business cycle on skill allocation in the academic
labor market. This is done by relating the research productivity and career choice of
(potential) economists graduating from the top 30 US universities to the change in
the unemployment rate during the last 50 years. To guide our empirics, we develop
a Roy-style model (1951) of the selection of talent between business and academia,
where entering academia is competitive but attractive during recessions. This model
predicts that fewer economists who faced a recession at time of application to the PhD
program stay in academia after graduation. Those who do stay are positively selected
on academic productivity. Moreover, if there is a recession at the time of graduation,
more economists pursue academic employment, which leads to more publications per
PhD graduate.
The results of the empirical analysis strongly support the theoretical predictions.
In particular, they show that individuals do react to recession shocks. Economists
applying or graduating during recessions publish significantly more than economists
applying or graduating in a boom. A recession at entry leads to fewer PhD students
staying in academia, a recession at graduation has the opposite effect. Moreover,
the effects are of economically substantial magnitude. Taking our estimates liter-
ally, we expect assistant professors from the cohort of graduate students who applied
for the PhD during the recession of 2008 (3.5 percentage points increase in unem-
1See, for example, Oreopoulos, Wachter, and Heisz (2008), Sullivan and von Wachter (2009),
Kahn (2010), Kondo (2008), Oyer (2006), Oyer (2008).
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ployment) to be around 24 percent more productive than assistant professors from a
cohort applying in an average year (0 percent unemployment change). We also expect
PhD graduates from 2008 to produce on average 20 percent more publications than
economists graduating in an average year.
Our results contribute to several discussions in the academic literature: First,
they show that individuals strongly and persistently react to (temporary) shocks in
terms of career choice, which leads to a change in the allocation of talent between
sectors. This adds to the broader debate about the allocation of talent, especially in
the financial sector and in teaching.2 Second, by observing that individuals at the
top of the skill distribution switch between sectors, we infer that they possess general
ex-ante talents and that even ex-post, after six years of specific PhD training, some
individuals’ skills are general enough to go back to the private sector. This relates
to the born versus made debate in labor economics (e.g. Bertrand 2009, Oyer 2008).
Third, we note that the predictions of a Roy-style model are strongly supported by
the data in our quasi-experimental empirical setting. Fourth, our results imply that
it is possible to lure talent to research by increasing wages.
For our empirical analysis we construct a new dataset of economists’ career choices
and publication output from publicly available sources. The dataset consists of grad-
uation years and the degree granting universities of 13,624 PhDs since 1955 from
the top 30 American institutions. We match each person with all their publications
available on JStor and with an indicator for becoming a faculty member or a member
of the American Economic Association (AEA) after the PhD. Thus, we can calculate
the propensity to stay in academia and the publication output for each economist.
Finally, we aggregate each cohort according to university and graduation year, and
match the change in the unemployment rate at time of application to and at time of
graduation from a PhD program. The change in the umemployment rate serves as a
proxy for the macroeconomic (labor market) conditions and the state of the business
cycle. We quantify the influence of the change in the unemployment rate at time of
2See, for example, Philippon and Reshef (2009), Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2010) and
Bacolod (2007).
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application and at graduation on both the economists’ propensity to decide in favor
of academic employment and on their productivity.
Our paper is closely related to three distinct strands of the literature. First, as
mentioned above, we contribute to the recent literature that analyzes the effect of
business cycle shocks on individuals’ careers. Kahn (2010) finds large and persistent
negative wage effects of graduating from college in a worse economy. Oreopoulos,
Wachter, and Heisz (2008) show that university graduates who enter the labor market
during a recession experience a substantial initial loss of earnings, which fades only
after 8–10 years, but that more highly skilled graduates suffer less because they switch
to better firms rapidly.3 Our study is the first to look at highly skilled individuals’
response to these recession shocks by changing careers and its effect on the skill
composition in one of the affected sectors. The results are consistent with those of
Oreopoulos, Wachter, and Heisz (2008), as we find that more highly skilled individuals
(are able to) respond more strongly.
The second strand of the literature to which we contribute is concerned with
sorting in the labor market. While the papers above generally find that vertical, non-
voluntary sorting (i.e., worse job placements whose effects are long-lasting) is the
source of the negative impact of recession shocks, we consider horizontal, voluntary
sorting (i.e., the individual’s decision to continue their career in a different sector).
In two papers in 2006 and 2008, Paul Oyer estimates the effect of vertical sorting
on long term earnings and productivity by instrumenting MBAs’ and economists’
first placements with the state of the economy at the time of graduation. Combining
Oyer’s paper and ours on economics PhDs, it may well be that we underestimate the
strength of our selection effect because of his placement effect and vice versa.4
There are plenty of well-known studies that are concerned with the sectoral selec-
tion of skills and the empirical content of the Roy model. Most of these papers employ
“structural” econometric techniques while our quasi-experimental study doesn’t need
3Other papers in this strand of the literature include Sullivan and von Wachter (2009),von
Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2008), and Kondo (2008).
4For a more detailed explanation, see Section 4.4Effect on the Publications of
Academicssubsection.4.4.
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to rely on specific distributional assumptions about skills, for example.5 We nonethe-
less find strong empirical support for the predictions of the Roy model. Another
influential recent study by Philippon and Reshef (2009) describes the relationship
between relative wages and human capital in the financial sector in the United States
over the last century, but is unable to establish a causal effect of the former on the
latter. In contrast, we are able to shed some light on the causal relationship between
sectoral attractiveness and talent allocation.6
The third strand of the literature this paper deals with is concerned with the
determinants of scientific productivity and their potential policy implications. Our
study is most closely related to the papers that examine the impact of science funding
on research productivity. Funding increases, like recessions, raise the attractiveness
of the academic sector compared to the private sector. Goolsbee (1998) shows that
up to 50% of a government spending increase goes into higher salaries for scientists
and engineers. Suggesting that the supply of such knowledge workers is relatively
inelastic, he argues that a large fraction of governmental research funding may in
fact be ineffective and may only constitute a windfall gain for scientists. On the
contrary, our results imply that the quantity and/or quality of researchers should
strongly and persistently increase with more funding.7
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We derive our theoretical pre-
dictions from a modified version of the Roy Model in the next section. Then we
describe how we assembled our novel dataset of PhD economists’ publication success.
Section 4Resultssection.4 presents and interprets the empirical results while Section
5Conclusionsection.5 concludes.
5See Heckman and Honor (1990) and, more recently, Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Lee and
Wolpin (2006). An example of another non-structural paper on the Roy model is Borjas (1987).
6One paper that uses quasi-experimental identification to study sectoral selection is Bedard and
Herman (2008). They examine the impact of economic contractions on the likelihood for enrollment
in an advanced university degree program.
7Along these lines, Freeman and van Reenen (2009) assert that, at least in the long run, not
only the number of scientists but also the selection of talent into science will increase due to higher
salaries.
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2 Theory
We are interested in how the selection of skills into academia and business varies with
the state of the business cycle. This section modifies a standard Roy (1951) model for
the problem at hand. The Roy model analyzes the self-selection of individuals with
heterogeneous skills into sectors according to their highest expected earnings. In the
following, we model two sectors—academia and business—into which individuals can
self-select. Each individual has distinct skills (and therefore different wages) in each
sector but can choose only one occupation. The main departure from the original
Roy framework is that salaries in business vary with the business cycle and that the
number of open positions in academia is assumed to be fixed.
2.1 Assumptions
Suppose that individuals are endowed with two skills, an academic skill α and a
business skill β. There are two sectors, academia (A) and business (B), which produce
outputs utilizing the respective skills. Individuals maximize their expected lifetime
income by applying for jobs in academia or business.
The business sector is assumed to hire anyone with a wage wt corresponding to
their marginal product. The wage depends on the state of the business cycle yt, i.e.
a business employee’s marginal product is higher in a boom (high yt) and lower in a
recession (low yt):8
wB(β) = β + yt
On the other hand, salaries in the academic sector do not vary with the business
8We might adopt the more general notion of yapp and ygrad as the effect of the business cycle on
current wage, but also on career outcomes in the future. This interpretation is consistent with recent
papers that find substantial effects of the current business cycle on long term career outcomes, e.g.
Oyer (2008) or Oreopoulos, Wachter, and Heisz (2008).
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cycle and each worker is deterministically paid his marginal product910
wA(α) = α.
To become an academic, an individual must decide for academia twice: first by
applying to a PhD program (at time of application t = app) and a second time by
pursuing an assistant professorship after the PhD (at graduation t = grad). At time
of application, we assume that PhD programs admit the best N applicants according
to academic skill and that there are always more applicants than available spaces.
Thus, the entry into the doctoral program is competitive. This assumption seems
reasonable as we consider the top 30 PhD programs in the US only. At graduation,
we assume that the student can choose freely if he wants to stay in academia or
enter the business sector instead. This assumption is more disputable: obtaining
an assistant professorship at a (top)ranked institution is very competitive. However,
conditioned on graduating from one of the top 30 US economics departments, it seems
unlikely that a student cannot secure an academic job in a lower ranked institution,
a teaching college, or a university outside the United States.
When taking his decision to apply for a PhD program, the applicant should also
take account of the option value of having another choice about his career path
after graduation. To simplify our problem, we assume that this option value is a
constant, i.e. that it does not vary with the state of the macroeconomy at the time
of application.11 Thus, we can include it in the individual’s expected earnings as an
9We can interpret α more generally as a combination of an individual’s marginal product in
academia and his non-pecuniary payoff for working in such an environment.
10All the results remain the same when we specify general wage functions wB = f(β, y) and
wA = g(β, y) as long as df/dy > dg/dy. Proofs for this case are available from the authors upon
request.
11In effect, this assumption amounts to imposing that the business cycle at time of application
has no predictive power for the business cycle at graduation. We think that this is defendable as it
takes on average six years to complete a PhD and we show in Appendix DThe Relationship Between
(Potentially) Confounding Factors and the Business CycleAppendix.1.D that there is no correlation
between the business cycle at time of application and graduation in our data. In general, we
expect that our results should also hold in all of the cases where there is a reversal in the business
cycle during that time frame, i.e., Pr(yBoomgrad |yRecapp ) > Pr(yBoomgrad |yBoomapp ) and Pr(yRecgrad|yBoomapp ) >
Pr(yRecgrad|yRecapp ), and in a lot of cases where there is sufficiently strong mean reversion.
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academic α.
Given these assumptions, an individual compares the expected earnings from
academia α and business β+ yt at time of application and at graduation. He decides
to apply for the academic sector (the PhD program or the assistant professorship)
whenever
α > β + yt. (1)
with t ∈ {app, grad}.12
2.2 Predictions
We are interested in how the selection of skills into academia and business varies with
the state of the business cycle. To ease the exposition, we compare a generic boom
cohort versus a generic recession cohort, i.e. yBoom > yRec. All proofs are relegated
to Appendix AFormal Results and ProofsAppendix.1.A.
Proposition 2.1 For PhD applicants, the joint distribution of academic and business
skills selected into the academic sector during a recession first order stochastically
dominates (FSD) the corresponding boom distribution.13
Figure 1Selection with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills at application.figure.caption.1
illustrates Proposition 2.1Predictionstheorem.2.1 when academic and business skills
are distributed uniformly in the unit interval. Given our assumptions, an individual’s
career choice is governed by a “one-shot” decision, with those individuals for whom
α > β + yapp preferring academia. During a boom (a high yBoomapp ), fewer individuals
apply for academia than during a recession (a low yRecapp ), which is depicted by a higher
12Furthermore we could have added to the model that a PhD constitutes an (uncertain) investment
into academic (and business) skills. This is clearly an important feature of obtaining a graduate
education and we did this in an earlier version of this section. However, as long as the skill update
and the uncertainty about it can be assumed to be independent of the state of business cycle, it
doesn’t do anything to the predictions of the model other than adding noise.
13On the flipside, this implies that the joint distribution of skills selected into business during a
boom first order stochastically dominates its recession counterpart. Note that in contrast to the
well known result of the general Roy model (e.g. see Heckman and Honor 1990), we can make a
definitive statement about the stochastic dominance for a general distribution of skills here. This
is due to the assumption of binding quantity constraints and the resulting competitiveness of the
admission into the academic sector.
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cutoff line for the former than for the latter. Academic employers always hire a fixed
number, N , of graduates (PhDs & “only in boom” in boom, PhDs & “only in reces-
sion” in recessions) and therefore the distribution of skills for the recession cohort lies
to the “North-East” of the corresponding distribution for the boom cohort.
Figure 1: Selection with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills at application.
However, Proposition 2.2Predictionstheorem.2.2 shows that fewer of the PhDs
who were admitted in a recession will decide to stay in academia and become assistant
professors after the PhD.
Proposition 2.2 For every realization of the state of the economy at graduation
ygrad, a (weakly) higher fraction of the members of a “recession at time of application”
cohort will not decide to stay in academia after the PhD.
The proposition implies that, on average, cohorts of PhD graduates more often
want to leave academia if they experienced a recession at the time of application. Fig-
ure 2Selection with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills at graduation.figure.caption.2
provides some intuition for the proposition. The academic skill cutoff, above which
individuals will prefer academic employment after the PhD, “on average” moves down
to the dashed line in the figure for a boom cohort and up for a recession cohort. Thus,
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in the figure, some individuals of the recession cohort want to exit academia and en-
ter business after the PhD when the economy is out of recession, while everyone in
the boom cohort wants to stay in academia. The recession graduates who want to
leave academia here are the marginal ones who applied for the PhD “because of” the
recession in the first place.
Figure 2: Selection with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills at graduation.
Proposition 2.3 For any given realization of the business cycle at graduation ygrad,
the (partial) distribution of academic skills of the members of a “recession at appli-
cation” cohort who want to stay in academia after the PhD first order stochastically
dominates the distribution of skills of the corresponding members of the “boom at
application” cohort.14
Proposition 2.3Predictionstheorem.2.3 implies that, no matter how many more
recession students than boom students leave academia after the PhD, the recession
students who want to stay in academia are still better in each quantile of their (aca-
demic) skill distribution. In our specific example in Figure 2Selection with a U(0,1)
distribution of both skills at graduation.figure.caption.2 we see that, although some
14However, the stochastic dominance of the joint distribution of business and academic skills does
not feed through in general.
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mass of the recession cohort is cut off, the recession distribution of skills in academia
still lies to the “North-East” of the boom distribution.
The effect of the business cycle at graduation (ygrad) is more straightforward. In
a recession, more graduates decide to take up academic employment than in a boom.
For these graduates who enter academia “because of” the business cycle the following
equation holds: β + yRecgrad < α ≤ β + yBoomgrad .
Proposition 2.4Predictionstheorem.2.4 restates this observation and Figure 3Selec-
tion at graduation.figure.caption.3 provides a graphical representation in the special
case of PhD graduates with academic and business skills distributed uniformly in the
unit square.
Proposition 2.4 A higher fraction of PhD economists decide to stay in the academic
sector if they experience a recession at graduation.
Figure 3: Selection at graduation.
Finally, we can reformulate the three propositions of the model into empirical
predictions for our data:
1. Economists who experienced a recession at the time of application for the
PhD are less likely to stay in academia after graduation (from Proposition
2.2Predictionstheorem.2.2).
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2. However, if they stay, they are better researchers, both on average and in each
quantile of their publication distribution (from Proposition 2.3Predictionstheorem.2.3).
3. Economists who experienced a recession at graduation from the PhD are more
likely to stay in academia (from Proposition 2.4Predictionstheorem.2.4),
4. and, therefore, recession PhD graduates publish more on average (also from
Proposition 2.4Predictionstheorem.2.4).
3 Data
We have collected a new dataset of career choices and individual productivity for
a large sample of economists in the United States from 1955 to 2004. We aggre-
gate the individuals into university year cohorts and match these with the change in
unemployment in the year of application and the year of graduation.15
3.1 Economist Sample Selection
The bases of our dataset are the names, graduation years and PhD granting institu-
tions of 13,624 economists who graduated from the top 30 US universities from 1955
to 1994. This data is obtained from the American Economic Association’s (AEA)
yearly “List of Doctoral Dissertations in Economics”, which was published in the Pa-
pers and Proceedings issue of the “American Economic Review” until 1986 and in the
“Journal of Economic Literature” thereafter. We supplement this information with
the tier of the degree granting university according to the ranking of the National
Research Council.16
15For the details of the data collection procedure, refer to Appendix BData Collection and
ProcessingAppendix.1.B.
16The National Research Council rankings of economics graduate programs divide programs into
tiers. The top three tiers include:
• Tier 1 (ranked 1–6): Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale;
• Tier 2 (ranked 7–15): Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Northwestern, Pennsylvania,
Rochester, California-Berkeley, California-Los Angeles, and Wisconsin-Madison;
• Tier 3 (ranked 16–30): Illinois-Urbana, Boston University, Brown, Cornell, Duke, Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan State, New York University, North Carolina, Texas-Austin, Virginia,
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3.2 Career Choice and Productivity Measures
We add an “academic” indicator which takes the value one if the economist was
a faculty member in a US economics, business or finance department in 2001 or
listed as a member of the American Economic Association, and otherwise zero. The
US faculty directories are compiled by James R. Hasselback and made available on
his webpage.17 AEA Membership data is obtained from the American Economic
Association Directory of Members in 1970, 1974, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003
or 2007. AEA membership serves as a proxy for faculty membership outside of the
United States, because Hasselback’s faculty directories strongly focus on US colleges
and feature only very few foreign institutions.
In order to compare the oeuvres of different economists over time we calculate a
consistent measure of publication productivity. For all economists in our sample, we
collect the publication records in the first ten years after their graduation, multiply
each publication of an author by its weight (“publication points”) according to a
dynamic journal ranking, and divide it by the number of coauthors of the paper. We
then sum up all these contributions within the ten years after graduation to obtain
a productivity measure for every individual in our sample.
More specifically, we match the PhD graduates with their publications (includ-
ing journal title, number of pages and the number and identity of co-authors) in 74
journals listed in JSTOR, a leading online archive of academic journals. We select
all journals contained in JSTOR for which a ranking was available. Thus we in-
clude all major publications in economics and finance except the journals published
by Elsevier, most notably the “Journal of Monetary Economics” and the “Journal
of Econometrics”.18 To ensure comparability among researchers, we restrict our at-
tention to the first ten years after graduation. JSTOR currently only provides full
California-San Diego, University of Washington, and Washington University-St. Louis.
Source: “The American Economic Association Graduate Study in Economics Web Pages”, accessed
2011-02-08, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/gradstudents/
17Source: “Faculty Directories”, James R. Hasselback, accessed 2011-02-07, http://www.
facultydirectories.com/
18Because we do not believe that either recession or boom cohorts systematically prefer or dislike
Elsevier journals, this should be of no consequence.
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publication data up to the year 2004. With the ten year requirement we can thus
rightfully analyze the sample from 1955 to 1994 without placing younger researchers
at a disadvantage.
Comparing the value of the collected publications records for different researchers
over the decades is difficult because the relative impact of economics journals has
changed substantially over time (Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2006). Therefore, we
construct a dynamic journal ranking with decade specific publication points for
each journal from 1950 onwards. For the period from 1960 to the 1989, we use
the ranking from Laband and Piette (1994), for the 1990s the equivalent ranking
published in Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003), and for the 2000s the
recursive discounted ranking available on the “ideas” webpage.19 For the 1950s we
were not able to find a journal ranking and thus decided to extrapolate a rank-
ing for articles published in the 1950s from our 1960s ranking. A complete list
of these journals with their associated publication points can be found in Table
6Rankingofjournalsindifferentdecades.table.caption.17 of Appendix B.4Ranking
Methods and Interpretation of the Productivity Measuresubsection.1.B.4.
In the Appendix C.1Alternative Measures for Productivitysubsection.1.C.1, we
show that our results are robust to the use of other productivity measures.
3.3 Macro Data and PhD Entry Date
The main aim of our study is to relate the career decisions and the publication success
of economists to a proxy for the state of the macroeconomy at the times of application
to and graduation from their PhD program. As our data contains only person-specific
graduation dates, we infer the application date by subtracting the median duration of
a PhD of 6 years from the graduation date.20 As proxy for the state of the business
19Refer to “IDEAS/RePEc Recursive Discounted Impact Factors for Journals”, last accessed 2009-
07-31, http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html. Note, however, that the
ranking on the website is updated continuously and thus is not exactly the same as we use in this
study. The ranking that we use here was downloaded on 2009-07-31.
20The median duration of a PhD stayed almost constant at from five to six years since the
1970s (see Table 7Duration of a PhDtable.caption.18 in Appendix B.5Imputing the PhD Entry
Datesubsection.1.B.5).
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cycle, we use the change in the rate of unemployment from June of the preceding
year to June of the considered year. Therefore, we measure the creation of new jobs
right before the start of the PhD program (at application) and during the academic
job market (at graduation).
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recession indicators are ar-
guably the most convincing measures of recessions and all of the results in the paper
hold (qualitatively) if we use them instead of unemployment change. However, binary
indicators cannot carry information about the state of the economy as fine as con-
tinuous measures. Unemployment change is such a continuous measure and—out of
several candidate variables that are available for the whole of our sample period—it
is the most strongly correlated with the NBER recession indicators.21 Moreover, we
believe that the change in unemployment is a good proxy for the change in university
graduates’ private sector employment opportunities, i.e. their outside option.
Refer to Section F.1Alternative Measures for the Business Cycle and Controls
for the Time Trendsubsection.1.F.1 in the Appendix for our main results using the
NBER recession indicators and GDP growth as measures of the business cycle as well
as a table with the correlations of these measures, and with unemployment levels and
GDP levels. Refer to Section F.3Alternative Duration of the PhDsubsection.1.F.3 for
a sensitivity analysis with regard to the duration of the PhD.
3.4 Aggregation to University-Year Level
Finally, we group our graduates’ publication performances and the indicator for being
an academic or not into university-graduation year averages. Thus, we reduce the
number of our observations from 13,624 individuals who graduated from institutions
in tiers one, two, and three between 1955 to 1994, to 1068 cohort means. Because we
do not use any explanatory or control variables that vary below the university-year
level, this grouping entails no loss of information.
21Other potential proxies for the business cycle, for example job openings for university graduates
or financial services activity, are not available for the entire study period. We want to thank Paul
Oyer for sharing his data on financial services activity.
14
3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1Summary Statisticstable.caption.4 provides summary statistics for the PhD
cohorts’ average productivity, the average probability to become an academic, and
the macroeconomic variation.
The average ten-year productivity of a university-year cohort is about 31.49 pub-
lication points. In order to translate these publication points in terms of articles in a
certain journal, one has to take into account that the importance of journals changes
over time. For example, an article in the American Economic Review (AER) in the
1990s was worth 100 publication points while it was “only” worth 40.2 points in the
1980s.22 Therefore, the average ten-year productivity of a university-year cohort in
the full sample is about the equivalent of one-third of an AER article in the 1990s.
The average probability to become an academic is about 60% and is slightly falling
over time as we can see in Figure 4aSubfigure 4asubfigure.4.1. Conditioned on being
an academic, the average ten-year cohort productivity totals 48.14 publication points.
This is about 50% of an article in the AER in the 1990s.
Figure 4bSubfigure 4bsubfigure.4.2 depicts the average productivity of the PhD
cohorts for every year in our analysis. More specifically, it distinguishes between
the average productivity of all graduates and graduates that became an academic.
As expected, we see that the performance measures move together to a substantial
degree.
The change in the unemployment rate, our main independent variable, has a mean
value of zero. The 10% quantile is -1.1 percentage points and the 90% quantile is 2.1
percentage points for the change in the rate of unemployment at time of application.
At graduation, the 10% quantile is -0.9 percentage points and the 90% quantile
1.5 percentage points. Figure (4cSubfigure 4csubfigure.4.3) plots the change in the
unemployment rate of each cohort at time of application and at graduation from 1955
to 1994. As expected the change in unemployment exhibits significant variation over
the years.
22Refer to Appendix B.4Ranking Methods and Interpretation of the Productivity
Measuresubsection.1.B.4 for a more detailed interpretation.
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mean sd min max p10 p90
Productivity 31.49 84.89 0.00 1738.10 0.00 93.80
Productivity Academic 48.14 103.84 0.00 1738.10 0.00 144.72
Academic 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Unempl Change (Application) -0.01 1.13 -2.10 2.90 -1.10 2.10
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.02 1.03 -2.10 2.90 -0.90 1.50
Observations 13624
Table 1: Summary Statistics
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4 Results
In the following we examine the empirical predictions derived from the modified Roy
model.
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4.1 Graphical Relationship and Empirical Specification
To get an initial sense of the degree to which the unemployment changes at time of
application and at graduation are related to the career decisions and productivity of
economists, the upper panel in Figures 5Fraction of academics and unemployment
changefigure.caption.6–7Productivity and unemployment changefigure.caption.8 plots
these variables over time. Moreover, the lower panel in each figure illustrates with a
kernel-weighted local mean smooth the degree of association of unemployment change
and our outcome variables. The shaded areas indicate the 90% confidence interval.
We employ an Epanechnikov kernel function and the rule-of-thumb bandwith esti-
mator.
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Figure 5: Fraction of academics and unemployment change
In accordance with theoretical prediction 1, unemployment change at time of ap-
plication seems to correlate slightly negatively with the propensity to become an aca-
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Figure 6: Productivity of academics and unemployment change
demic (left panel of Figure 5Fraction of academics and unemployment changefigure.caption.6).
The publication productivity of academics in the left panel of Figure 6Productiv-
ity of academics and unemployment changefigure.caption.7 correlates positively with
unemployment change at time of application as in prediction 2. In accordance with
predictions 3 and 4, a more positive change in unemployment at graduation seems to
be associated with more PhDs staying in academia (right panel of Figure 5Fraction of
academics and unemployment changefigure.caption.6) and a better publication record
(right panel of Figure 7Productivity and unemployment changefigure.caption.8), re-
spectively.
In order to analyze more formally the relationships depicted in the Figures, we
estimate the following model in three different specifications:
qi,t = β · yapp,t + γ · ygrad,t + δ · controls+ i,t (2)
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Figure 7: Productivity and unemployment change
In the first specification, the outcome variable qi,t is the average publication output
of a cohort of graduates from university i in year t. In the second specification, it is the
average propensity to decide in favor of an academic career after the PhD, and in the
third specification, qi,t is the average productivity of those who have decided to stay
in academia after the PhD. The unit of observation in all three cases is the average of
a given university in a given year, weighted by the amount of underlying individual
observations. Moreover, the standard errors are clustered on the graduation year level,
in order to allow for contemporaneous correlation between the outcome variables in
the presence of regressors that do not vary within a given year.
The regressors yapp,t and ygrad,t of interest are the unemployment changes at time of
application and at graduation, respectively. As control variables, we include dummies
for the full set of interactions of university and graduation decade. These dummies
pick up the (changing) quality differences of PhD education among universities over
19
time and they control for the higher standards of publication in recent decades (e.g.
Ellison 2002a, Ellison 2002b).23
We estimate Equation (2Graphical Relationship and Empirical Specificationequation.4.2)
using linear regressions. To identify the average treatment effect of the change in un-
employment on the respective outcome variable, we assume that the productivity and
the career decisions of a cohort of (potential) PhD economists do not contempora-
neously affect the business cycle in a given year. This assumption excludes potential
reverse causality.24 To be able to interpret β and γ exclusively as the causal param-
eters of the selection effect discussed in the theory section, we need an additional
exclusion restriction to be satisfied: we assume that unemployment change affects a
cohort’s career decisions and publications only in terms of changing their choice of
the sector to apply to (the selection effect). This assumption might not strictly be
true in the light of the result of Oyer (2006) that the state of the business cycle affects
an economist’s first job placement and thus his productivity. We explain in Section
4.4Effect on the Publications of Academicssubsection.4.4 that given Oyer’s result we
might actually underestimate the causal effect of selection in our regressions due to
leaving out the quality of the first job.
Table 2The main regression resultstable.caption.9 summarizes the main regression
results of the three specifications, each in one column. The following subsections
explain the columns in turn.
4.2 Effect on the Publications of all PhDs
The first column of Table 2The main regression resultstable.caption.9 shows the effect
of unemployment change on the publication output of an average PhD graduate in
the sample. Unemployment change, both at time of application and at graduation,
has a significantly positive effect on research productivity at the 5% and 1% level,
23We have run regressions using recession indicators and GDP growth as a measure of the busi-
ness cycle instead of unemployment change and we explored variants with linear and quadratic
time trends. Our results are robust to these changes and reported in Appendix CRobustness
ChecksAppendix.1.C.
24Furthermore, no third factor is allowed to influence both—the business cycle and, the career
decisions and productivity—directly.
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Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.540∗∗ -0.891 3.274∗∗∗
(0.661) (0.576) (0.945)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.312∗∗∗ 1.354∗∗ 2.738∗∗
(0.645) (0.607) (1.199)
Subsample All All Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: The main regression results
respectively. These two results are also economically substantial: a cohort on the
90% quantile of unemployment change at time of application is expected to achieve
4.9 publication points more than a cohort on the 10% quantile. This is approximately
12% of the mean. Similarly, if we do the same calculation for the graduation cohort,
the difference is 5.5 points, which is 17.6% of the mean.25
The effect of unemployment change at graduation is in line with empirical predic-
tion 4: PhDs who graduate during a recession publish more on average because more
of them decide to stay in academia. Thus, the theoretical effect is at the “extensive
margin” as opposed to an “intensive margin” effect in which those PhDs who would
have stayed in academia anyway are publishing more if they graduate in recession
than if they graduate in a boom.
The theory does not make a prediction which overall effect unemployment change
at time of application should have on the publication output of an average PhD gradu-
ate. On the one hand, according to Proposition 2.1Predictionstheorem.2.1, graduates
who experienced a recession at time of application constitute a better selection of in-
25Referring to Table 1Summary Statisticstable.caption.4 in Appendix B.4Ranking Methods and
Interpretation of the Productivity Measuresubsection.1.B.4, the difference between the 10% and
the 90% quantiles of unemployment change at time of application is 3.2. Multiplying this by the
parameter estimate of 1.540 gives a difference in average productivity between “boom” and “re-
cession” cohorts of 4.92 publication points. Referring to Table 6Ranking of journals in different
decades.table.caption.17, this is about the number of publication points one gets assigned for an
article in “Economica” during the 1990s. From Table 1Summary Statisticstable.caption.4, we also
find that the “average” PhD graduate achieves 31.49 publication points. Similarly at graduation the
difference between the 90% and 10% quantile is 2.4. Multiplying this with the estimate of 2.312,
yields 5.549 publication points, which is about 17.6% of the mean of 31.49.
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dividuals. On the other hand, according to Proposition 2.2Predictionstheorem.2.2,
fewer of these individuals are expected to stay in academia and publish after the
PhD. Empirically, it seems that the former effect dominates the latter, as a rise of
unemployment at time of application is associated with a higher publication output
of an average PhD.
4.3 Effect on Career Decisions
The second column of Table 2The main regression resultstable.caption.9 reports how
the unemployment change is related to economists’ career decisions after the PhD.
PhD graduates are more likely to stay in academia when the economy is ailing,
i.e. when there is a positive change in unemployment at graduation. The estimated
coefficient is significant at the 5% level. This confirms empirical prediction 3 from the
theory section and it is the source of the “extensive margin” effect on publication out-
put per PhD student we mentioned above. Taking the estimates literally, a member
of the cohort on the 90% quantile of unemployment change at graduation (+1.5%)
has a probability 3.24 percentage points higher to become an academic compared to
a PhD student graduating on the 10% quantile (-0.9%). The average propensity to
become an academic is 60%.
The theory also predicts that economists who experience a recession at entry
to the PhD are less likely to stay in academia afterwards because some of them
will enter only because of the recession (prediction 1). The evidence in Table 2The
main regression resultstable.caption.9 implies the existence of this effect, although
the reported coefficient is not statistically significant.
More generally, we are not sure how to measure the decision between academia and
business correctly. We think three different concepts of someone being an “academic”
are conceivable: First, one could only consider faculty members of higher learning
institutions as academics. This definition leaves out research staff at the IMF, the
World Bank and at research institutes. Second, one could argue that the relevant
distinguishing characteristic of an academic is producing novel and original research.
And finally, one could more generally consider anyone an academic who works on
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research-related topics and upholds a relationship with the academic community.
The evidence reported in Table 2The main regression resultstable.caption.9 is
based on the third notion of an academic by classifying anyone as such who is either
a faculty member or a member of the American Economic Association (AEA) after the
PhD. Table 3Different measures for being classified as an academictable.caption.10
additionally shows the measures of being an academic according to the first two
notions.
Academic Faculty Publish Academic
Unempl Change (Application) -0.891 -0.427 -0.979∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗
(0.576) (0.475) (0.457) (0.579)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 1.354∗∗ 0.535 0.414 2.866∗∗∗
(0.607) (0.409) (0.397) (0.938)
Subsample All All All Tier 1
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1068 234
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Different measures for being classified as an academic
Column two in this table shows the propensity to become an academic measured
by whether graduates end up as members of faculty at an economics, business or
finance department of a college or university in the United States according to the
listings published by Hasselback (2001). We see that the direction of the effect is
the same as in column one and in the main results table. However, the resulting
coefficients are not statistically significant for either point in time. This might be the
case because the employed faculty listings are not exhaustive. For example, faculty on
leave are not included and we do not have faculty directories for other departments,
such as law and agriculture. Our faculty listings are also strongly focused on US
institutions. Thus, they miss many foreign graduates who become professors in their
home countries and are members of the AEA.
Column three defines an academic as an individual who, according to our data,
publishes at least one article in a ranked scientific journal after his or her PhD. The
effect of the business cycle at the time of application is significant in the direction we
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expect from the theory while the effect at graduation is weak and not significant.26
Column 4 in Table 3Different measures for being classified as an academictable.caption.10
also shows regressions for the propensity to become an academic (according to our
preferred academic measure) for a subsample of our graduates from the six top-ranked
universities, i.e. the tier one schools. The effect here is strongly significant in the
predicted direction for both unemployment change at graduation and at time of ap-
plication. We interpret this as evidence that it is actually the individuals at the very
top of the skill distribution which are most able to successfully switch back and forth
between academia and business and who thus possess what one could call general
skills. Overall, we conclude that the results at hand support the predictions made by
our theory about the career decisions of PhD graduates.27
4.4 Effect on the Publications of Academics
The last column of Table 2The main regression resultstable.caption.9 shows the re-
sults of regressing the publication output of individuals classified as academics on the
change in the unemployment rate. The results here are robust to the sample selection
according to any of the three definitions of an academic that were discussed above (see
Table 23Alternative measure for being an academic: Productivitytable.caption.35 in
26This seems to confirm the different reasons for becoming an academic in relation to the two
points in time: on the one hand, those individuals who become an academic because the economy
is bad at graduation are just added at the extensive margin and some of them might not be able
to write a ranked article. On the other hand, those individuals who experienced a recession at time
of application and decide against academia after the PhD are of high academic ability according to
the theory. Thus, a larger share of them would have been able to write a ranked article had they
stayed in academia.
27One concern that was expressed to us is that foreign students may go back to their home
country after the PhD. For example, Borjas (2006) shows that the share of foreign doctoral students
has more than doubled since the 1970s. If hiring in the academic sector in the US is (somewhat)
cyclical too, one might imagine that, in recessions, more foreign students go back to academic jobs
in their respective home countries. We do not have information about whether students are natives
or foreigners in our dataset. In terms of our model, if there are foreign academic programs whose
hiring is less correlated with the US business cycle than US schools’ hiring, this makes demand
for economists more inelastic. If those graduates who take the option to go back more often in
recessions appear in the faculty listings, the AEA listings, or if they publish in ranked journals, they
are counted as academics. This fits our story. If they are not counted as academics, our estimates
in Table 2The main regression resultstable.caption.9 will understate the effect of the business cycle
at graduation on the propensity to become an academic and, depending on whether it is the high-α
or the low-α PhDs who react more to this, our estimates will under- or overstate the effect on the
publications per graduate. Note that our model does not make predictions on the latter effect.
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Appendix F.2Alternative Measures for Being an Academicsubsection.1.F.2).
The productivity of academics who experienced a recession at time of application
is higher than that of academics who applied during a boom. This is in line with
prediction 2 which states that the selection of PhD entrants is better during econom-
ically difficult times and that this better selection persists to the PhD graduates who
stay in academia. The coefficient is significant at the 1% level and of economically
relevant magnitude: comparing the average member of the cohort on the 90% quan-
tile of unemployment change at time of application to a cohort member on the 10%
quantile, the former is on average 10.47 publication points better than the latter.
This is about 20% of the mean.28
In fact, prediction 2 states that a generic recession at time of application cohort
should first order stochastically dominate a generic boom at time of application co-
hort with respect to academic skill. Therefore, not only the mean but the whole
distribution of academic skills should shift to the right if unemployment increases.
Table 4Quantile regression for the academic subsamplestable.caption.11 shows the
effect of the unemployment change on the distribution of publication output within
each cohort using quantile regressions. A unit of observation is now an individual
academic’s publication output.29 Among those PhDs who are considered academics
according to our “academic” measure, 45 percent do not publish at all. We therefore
restrict Table 4Quantile regression for the academic subsamplestable.caption.11 to
the effect of unemployment change on the median of the publication distribution and
above. The estimates are in the predicted direction and significant for the upper
quantiles of the publication distribution, but they become insignificant for the lower
quantiles. The reason for this is probably that the “academic” measure is not perfect
at separating academics who do not publish from individuals who have left academia
28The 10% quantile of unemployment change at time of application is -1.1 percentage points,
the 90% quantile is 2.10 percentage points and the difference is therefore 3.2 percentage points.
Multiplying this difference with the mean estimate of 3.274 yields 10.4768. The mean productivity
for an academic is 48.14 publication points.
29We only control for university tier–graduation decade fixed effects and their interactions here,
because the quantile estimation becomes much less reliable with a large number of dummy controls.
The standard errors are not clustered on the graduation year level as this is not straightforward to
implement with quantile regressions.
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after the PhD. We know that there are more such individuals among the recession
at application cohort, some of which are thus mistaken as low-skill academics. This
downward-biases the difference between the publication distributions, most strongly
so at the lower quantiles.30
50% 65% 80% 95%
Unempl Change (Application) -0.000∗∗∗ 0.445 3.699∗∗∗ 9.343∗
(0.000) (0.674) (1.300) (5.022)
Unempl Change (Graduation) -0.000∗∗∗ 1.130 3.869∗∗∗ 0.623
(0.000) (0.708) (1.344) (5.221)
Subsample Academic Academic Academic Academic
Tier-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8222 8222 8222 8222
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Quantile regression for the academic subsamples
The second line in column three of the main results, Table 2The main regression
resultstable.caption.9, reports the effect of unemployment change at graduation on
the research productivity of academics. There are more PhDs deciding for an aca-
demic career if there is a recession at graduation. Without a specific assumption on
the distribution of skills of PhD economists, our theory does not make a prediction
whether the additional academics who enter at the “extensive margin” are of higher
or lower academic skill than the average of those graduates who always decide to stay
in academia after the PhD.
The empirical result in Table 2The main regression resultstable.caption.9 suggests
that on average PhD students with higher academic ability decide to stay in academia
if the economy is in a state of recession compared to a state of boom. This is in line
with the result already noted in Section 4.3Effect on Career Decisionssubsection.4.3,
that it seems to be the individuals at the top of the skill distribution who are able to
successfully move between the sectors. The estimated coefficient is significant at the
30If we define an academic according to whether he publishes in a ranked journal instead of AEA
membership or appearance in a faculty listing, and thus condition on non-zero publications, our
quantile regressions yield positive and significant effects of unemployment change in line with the
theory over the whole publication distribution.
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5% level. An academic graduating on the 90% quantile of unemployment change is
on average 6.67 publication points better than an academic graduating on the 10%
quantile. This is about 13% of the mean of 48.14.
At first glance, the result that academics who experience a recession at gradu-
ation are more successful at publishing than those who experience a boom, seems
to contradict the findings by Paul Oyer (2006). He shows that PhDs who graduate
during a favorable academic job market (which is correlated with economically good
times in general) obtain better initial academic placements. He further shows that
the first placement has a positive causal effect on an economist’s research output by
instrumenting the first placement with the state of the academic job market during
the graduation year.
However, we think that Oyer’s and our result may not be contradictory, but that
they could actually reinforce each other: suppose that both effects are relevant in
reality—Oyer’s placement effect and our selection effect. On the one hand, we would
underestimate the effect of the business cycle at graduation on the skills selected
into academia. This is because we would not take into account the worse placement
a recession economist experiences on average, which would lower our measure of his
skill, the publication output. Thus, the individuals selected into academia in recession
would actually be better in terms of ex-ante skill than our estimate indicates. On the
other hand, Oyer would underestimate the causal effect of the first placement on the
research output of an economist. This is because he would not take into account the
lower average ex-ante skill of a given economist during boom due to selection.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the effect of aggregate labor market conditions on the ca-
reer choices and research productivity of economics PhDs in the United States. We
documented that individuals who applied for—and graduated from—PhD programs
during a recession produce substantially more research. Moreover, our results on
the economists’ career decisions provide strong evidence that the productivity effects
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arise from a self-selection into sectors driven by the state of the labor market. Us-
ing a Roy-style model of self-selection into sectors, we provided consolidated findings
for the larger debate about the allocation of talent. For example, we think that it is
reasonable to believe that the same effects that we found for economists should (qual-
itatively) matter for the allocation of talent into the financial sector or the teaching
profession, too.
Given the severity of the crisis of 2008–09 and, in response, the large extent to
which people flooded graduate schools with applications, our findings suggest that an
exceptionally able selection of students may graduate from these cohorts. Further, we
provide a rationale for countercyclical governmental funding of graduate education
that goes beyond mitigating the adverse impact of recessions on individuals. If it
is the aim to attract abler individuals to science and academia, it may be efficient
to specifically target recession cohorts with extra funding and additional spaces in
graduate programs.
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Appendices
A Formal Results and Proofs
Without loss of generality, we define the density function of academic and business
skills on the unit square, i.e. f(α, β) ≥ 0 for α, β ∈ [0, 1] and zero otherwise. Further-
more let N be the number of places in the PhD programs as a fraction of the whole
population of potential PhD students (i.e. N will be the fraction of all individuals
that enter the PhD). As in the main text, we compare a generic boom to a generic
recession cohort, i.e. yBoom > yRec. Furthermore, a person applies for a PhD if he
has skills such that α > β + y.
In order to facilitate the proofs in the following, we do three more things: First,
we define different sets of applicants to keep our notation concise in the rest of this
section. Second, we define conditional probabilities to be able to compare different
sets with each other. Third, we show that the least able (in terms of academic skills)
individual admitted into academia in a recession is academically more able than the
least able individual admitted in a boom. This result is used repeatedly in the proofs
of the propositions.
1. The following distinct sets of applicants are used in the proofs and illustrated
in Figure 8Example with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills.figure.caption.14:
• C(onstant) applicants, who enter academia no matter what happens in the
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business cycle.
C = {(α, β)|α ≥ αRecα ∧ α > β + yBoom}
• B(usiness inclined), who only select themselves into academia if the busi-
ness climate necessitates it.
B = {(α, β)|α ≥ αRec ∧ β + yRec < α ≤ β + yBoom}
• A(cademically inclined), who want to go to academia but only have the
chance to if the group B members don’t apply.
A = {(α, β)|αBoom ≤ α < αRec ∧ α > β + yBoom}
• E(xternals), who never go to academia.
Figure 8: Example with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills.
Note that A∪C is the boom cohort and B∪C the recession cohort. Furthermore,
from our assumption that there are always more people applying for a PhD-
program than there are spaces, it follows that y has an upper bound.
2. We introduce the following notation for the probability of being member of the
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set X (or fulfilling the condition X) conditionally on being member of the set
Y:
PY (X) =
P (X ∩ Y )
P (Y ) .
This conditional probability is always within [0,1] and can be interpreted as the
fraction of members of X who are member of Y. If the subscript Y is dropped, we
refer to the the fraction of X compared to all potential applicants. As mentioned
above, N is the the fraction of individuals actually entering the academic sector,
i.e. in a recession N = P (C ∪B) and in a boom N = P (C ∪ A).
3. We show that the cut-off value αs is weakly higher in recession than in boom.
A higher cut-off value implies that the least able (in terms of academic skills)
individual admitted into academia in a recession is academically more able than
the least able individual admitted in a boom.
Lemma A.1 αBoom ≤ αRec.
Proof of lemma A.1Formal Results and Proofstheorem.1.A.1: Let
gy(α) :=
∫ α−y
0 f(α, β) dβ be the percentage of students with academic skill α
who will apply to the PhD-program. Obviously yBoom > yRec ⇒ gyBoom ≤ gyRec
as f ≥ 0 for all (α, β). Therefore αRec ≥ αBoom as the equality ∫ 1αRec gyRec dα =
N =
∫ 1
αBoom gyBoom dα has to hold.
Proof of proposition 2.1Predictionstheorem.2.1: : First, note that by the
definition of A and B, PA(x ≥ α) = 0 if α > αRec and PB(x ≥ α) = 1 if α ≤ αRec.
Second, as P (A) = P (B) = N − P (C) it follows that PA∪C(x ≥ α) ≤ PB∪C(x ≥ α),
which is the definition of first order stochastic dominance. As the argumentation
holds analogously for the business skills, this implies a joint stochastic dominance of
academic and business skills of the recession cohort compared to the boom cohort.
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Proof of proposition 2.2Predictionstheorem.2.2: In case of ygrad < yBoom some
or no people in set B leave the recession cohort and nothing changes in the boom
cohort. If ygrad ≥ yBoom, all people in B leave. All remaining members of the recession
cohort (who are member of set C and may or may not leave) are a subset of the boom
cohort and therefore behave alike. Note that, as P(B) = P(A) and all members of
B, but potentially only some members of A, leave for ygrad ≥ yBoom, there are always
more leavers in the recession than in the boom cohort.
Proof of proposition 2.3Predictionstheorem.2.3: Let B′ be a subset of B. We
show that C ∪B′ first order stochastically dominates C ∪A in the partial distribution
of academic skill, which is the proposition for ygrad < yBoom. It follows for all α that
PC∪B′(x ≥ α) = PC∪B′(C)PC(x ≥ α) + PC∪B′(B′)PB′(x ≥ α),
and analogously PC∪A(x ≥ α) = PC∪A(C)PC(x ≥ α) + PC∪A(A)PA(x ≥ α). This
means that the percentage of members in C and B’ who have an academic skill
larger than some arbitrary α is the weighted sum of the percentage of members in
C and of the percentage of members in B’ who have at least such a high academic
skill. The respective weights are the percentage of members of C in C union B’ and
the percentage of B’ in C union B’. (Remember that PC∪B′(C) is the percentage of
members of C in the union of C and B′.)
Now one can show as in Proposition 2.2 :
• PC∪B′(x ≥ α) ≥ PC∪B′(C)PC(x ≥ α) ≥ PC∪A(C)PC(x ≥ α) = PC∪A(x ≥ α) for
α ≥ αRec.
The first inequality holds by the decomposition of PC∪B′(x ≥ α) above, the
second inequality holds because P (A) = P (B) and the equality holds because
PA(x ≥ α) = 0 for α ≥ αRec by definition of the set A.
• PC∪B′(x ≥ α) = 1 ≥ PC∪A(C)PC(x ≥ α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+PC∪A(A)PA(x ≥ α) = PC∪A(x ≥ α)
for α < αRec. The first equality holds by the definition of C and B’, the first
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inequality by the definition of probability measures (it cannot exceed one) and
the second equality holds by the definition above.
These two statements taken together prove the first order stochastic dominance in
the partial distribution of the academic skill for the recession cohort compared to the
boom cohort.
Note, that the same argument can be made if ygrad ≥ yBoom with A′ and C ′ being
subsets of A and C, respectively, and B′ = ∅. This completes the proof.
For the proof of the last proposition we require one further piece of notation: Let
yBoomgrad denote the business cycle variable if there is a boom at graduation and yRecgrad
if there is a recession at graduation. Note that yBoomgrad >yRecgrad and therefore wBBoom =
β + yBoomgrad > wBRec = β + yRecgrad.
Proof of proposition 2.4Predictionstheorem.2.4: The PhD students with {α, β)|β+
yRecgrad < α ≤ β + yBoomgrad } leave academia when there is a boom instead of a recession
at graduation. As this set can be non-empty, weakly more students leave in a boom
than in a recession.
B Data Collection and Processing
This section explains in detail the data collection and processing procedure. Specifi-
cally, we explain how the sample of economists and their background variables were
acquired and how we computed measures of publication success. An overview of the
data sources is given in Table 5Data sourcestable.caption.15.
All employed programs are available from the authors upon request.
B.1 Database for Economics PhD Graduates
To construct our sample of economists, we downloaded the PDF version of all issues of
the American Economics Associations (AEA) yearly “List of Doctoral Dissertations in
Economics” from JSTOR, an online journal repository from 1950 to 2006. The list was
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Table 5: Data sources
Variable Description Source
Personal information of
graduates
Name, University and Gradua-
tion year
AEA “List of Doctoral Disserta-
tions in Economics” of 1955 to
2004
Faculty membership Faculty directory of (mainly
American) Economics, Business
and Finance departments by
John R. Hasselback
“Faculty Directories,” James
R. Hasselback, accessed
2011-02-07, http://www.
facultydirectories.com/
Membership in the AEA Membership data of the Amer-
ican Economic Association in
1970, 1974, 1981, 1985, 1989,
1993, 1997, 2003 and 2007
Supplement to the Papers and
Proceedings Issue in the respec-
tive year digitalized by JSTOR
University ranking Tier of a university according to
the National Research Council
“The American Economic
Association Graduate
Study in Economics Web
Pages,” accessed 2011-02-08,
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/
AEA/gradstudents/
Publication records Publications in 74 journals listed
in the JSTOR online repository,
from 1955 to 2004
“JSTOR Data for Research,”
last accessed 2011-02-07, http:
//dfr.jstor.org/.
Journal rankings Citation ranking of journals in
Economics, Business and Fi-
nance from 1950 to 2000
Laband and Piette (1994),
Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas,
and Stengos (2003), Kim,
Morse, and Zingales (2006)
and “IDEAS/RePEc Recursive
Discounted Impact Factors
for Journals,” last accessed
2011-02-07, ideas.repec.org/
Measure of the business
cycle
seasonally adjusted change in
unemployment or GDP growth
from 1949 to 1994
Thomson Reuters Datastream
Duration of the PhD Median years between registra-
tion and graduation from the
PhD for 1977, 1986, 1996, 1997,
2001
National Science Foundation,
Stock and Siegfried (2006),
Hansen (1991)
Number of Graduates
(NSF list)
Number of admitted and grad-
uating PhDs according to the
“NSF Survey of Earned Doctor-
ates/Doctorate Records File” of
the National Science Foundation
“WebCASPAR Integrated
Science and Engineering Re-
source Data System - NSF
Survey of Earned Doctor-
ates/Doctorate Records File,”
National Science Founda-
tion, last accessed 2011-02-08,
https://webcaspar.nsf.gov/
econphd.net ranking University ranking according to
econphd.net
“Rankings.” last accessed
2011-02-07, http://econphd.
econwiki.com/rankings.htm
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published in the Papers and Proceedings issue of the “American Economic Review”
until 1986 and in the “Journal of Economic Literature” thereafter. The AEA “List of
Doctoral Dissertations in Economics” specifies doctoral degrees conferred by U.S. and
Canadian universities for every year since 1906. The name of the degree recipients
and the year of graduation is provided to the American Economic Association by
each degree granting university.
To convert the available PDF version of the AEA doctoral list into a text file, we
used the optical character recognition (OCR) program included in the Adobe Acrobat
8 Professional Suite. The quality of the Adobe technology was best compared to
several other programs we have tried. This read-in procedure worked well in general
and it accelerated the compilation of the dataset but, as every automated procedure,
it also entailed several problems and imperfections. In some cases the original PDFs
were scans of old printed versions and, therefore, due to the quality of the source
files, the character recognition of some records was erroneous.
Particularly, there were problems with the letter “r”, which was mistaken as “n”
or “i” from time to time. “O” was sometimes read as zero, “H” as “II”, and “M”
as “IVI”. Also, dots sometimes were not readily recognized. We were able to correct
faulty university names and graduation years because the set of those is finite. For
example, we always replaced “IVIichigan” by “Michigan”. Due to limited resources,
we were not able to correct all errors in the name spellings. We decided to drop
observations with names that contain characters or sequences of characters that are
highly unlikely to be correct and thus had no chance to return accurate results in a
query for publications in JSTOR.
In a next step we used regular expressions, a way to assign database fields for
some string combinations, to convert the text file into a database format. The data
structure of the AEA doctoral list is quite regular so this procedure worked rea-
sonably well. On some instances, the employed regular expression was not able to
determine the end of a data entry due to missing dots. However, this did not happen
systematically.
As mentioned above, the read-in procedure delivered some faulty results. We
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believe that all these errors are orthogonal to our effect of interest and that they thus
just add noise to our data. Nevertheless we want to test how many read in names
are faulty: To do this, we first correct some years (perfectly) by hand and compare
the resulting “complete” graduation numbers to graduation numbers published by the
National Science Foundation (NSF). We find that the “complete” graduation numbers
from the AEA list are about 90% of the NSF graduation numbers. Then, for every
year, we compare the fraction of the “not corrected” number in our database to the
number in the NSF data. This fraction fluctuates from 0.6 to 0.9, which suggests that
in the worst case we lose about 40% of graduates due to the imperfect automated
read-in procedure. In Figure 9Number of graduates according to the NSF and the
AEA list over timefigure.caption.16 the number of NSF graduates and of graduates
from our AEA list are plotted over time.
Figure 9: Number of graduates according to the NSF and the AEA list over time
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In the next step we supplemented the information with the respective tier of the
degree granting university according to the National Research Council. The National
Research Council rankings of economics graduate programs divide programs into
tiers.
We dropped all graduates from universities not represented in this NRC rank-
ing because we are not sure if the application process and research environment in
these institutions are comparable to the universities in the first three tiers. In order to
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ensure robustness we also considered the Top 30 US universities according to the econ-
phd.net ranking (as in Oyer 2006), which yielded the same results. The econphd.net
ranking is available online on http://econphd.econwiki.com/rankings.htm (last
accessed 2011-02-07).
B.2 Indicator for Being an Academic
To complete the person-specific background variables, we add an indicator if a PhD
graduate became an “academic” later on. We define “academics” according to the
three concepts explained in section 4.3Effect on Career Decisionssubsection.4.3 - those
who are faculty members, those who are faculty members or AEA members, and
those who publish at least one ranked article. While the last concept derives from
our publication measure explained in the next subsection, the data collection for the
first two measures is described here.
Data about faculty membership in US economics, business or finance departments
is acquired from the webpage of James R. Hasselback from the University of West
Florida who regularly compiles U.S. faculty directories.31 Unfortunately, there is no
comprehensive database about faculty members of non-US universities, researchers in
other US university departments, like law and agriculture, and academics in institu-
tions other than universities, e.g. World Bank researchers. To construct a proxy for
belonging to these groups, we analyze the membership records of American Economic
Association. We think that the likelihood of being an AEA member is higher, if the
graduate decided to become a member of the academic community.32
The faculty listings and the AEA membership directories are only available as
PDF. Therefore, we again use the Adobe OCR program and regular expressions to
translate them into a database file. We use Apache Lucene, an information retrieval
library, to match the data on graduates with the faculty listing and the AEA mem-
bership. This is necessary because some students drop their second name over the
31“Faculty Directories,” James R. Hasselback, accessed 2011-02-07, http://www.
facultydirectories.com/
32Specifically, we take the AEA directory of members in 1970, 1974, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997,
2003 and 2007.
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years or abbreviate it. As is common for search engines, Lucene employs a scoring
algorithm based on the similarity of the name of the graduate and the name in the
documents.33 For the faculty directory (and a sample of the AEA members), we
checked the matches found by hand to ensure accuracy.
B.3 Publications
After compiling the database of graduates, we used a program to match each entry
with its publication record in JSTOR. To do this, we use the newly available XML
application programming interface of JSTOR, called “Data for Research” (DfR).34
Specifically, we entered the names and given names of all researchers contained in our
database and extracted all recorded publications with journal title, number of pages
and the number and identity of coauthors in the first 10 years after their graduation.
To be as specific as possible, we restricted our search to articles classified as “research
articles” published in English language in the fields of economics, business and finance.
The restriction to articles published ten years after graduation (as in Oyer 2006),
has three reasons: First, it improves the specificity of the data processing, because
economists with the same name who were born in different decades are not merged
but kept as different persons. Second, the quality of an economist is arguably best
revealed in the first decade after PhD graduation. Academic researchers are highly
motivated (incentivized) in this period because their tenure decision depends on the
publication record of these first years. Finally, graduates from more recent years
would be disadvantaged if we did not restrict the time frame. Currently JSTOR
provides full publication data up to the year 2004, so the last individuals we can
rightfully analyze following our ten year requirement are those who graduated in
1994.
33For a discussion of the scoring algorithm of Lucene please refer to “org.apache.lucene.search
- Class similarity,” last accessed 2011-02-07, http://lucene.apache.org/java/2_4_0/api/org/
apache/lucene/search/Similarity.html.
34JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/) (last accessed 2011-02-07) is a leading repository for archiv-
ing academic journals which contains (in July 2010) around 3.1 Million research articles for all
sciences with the first article published in 1545. For the DfR interface please refer to “JSTOR Data
for Research,” last accessed 2011-02-07,http://dfr.jstor.org/.
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B.4 Ranking Methods and Interpretation of the Productiv-
ity Measure
To measure the productivity of each individual on an cardinal scale, we have to
value each publication in the record. This poses three challenges: First, the relative
weight of an article in a certain journal compared to an article in another journal is a
constant matter of discussion in the profession. Second, comparing the value of publi-
cations over the decades is difficult because the relative impact of economics journals
has changed substantially over time ( Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2006). Third, by
summing up the contributions of different publications over ten years, the resulting
number becomes hard to interpret. We adress these challenges by showing the ro-
bustness of our result for several ranking methodologies with different strengths and
weaknesses below.
Our preferred method is a citation ranking based on the methodology of Laband
and Piette (1994). The authors of this study use the citations to articles in a particular
journal (excluding self-citations) as a measure of its quality or impact. Their paper
presents the journal impact factors from the 1960s to the 1980s, while Kalaitzidakis,
Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003) use the same method for the 1990s and the recursive
discounted ranking on the ideas.org ranking page delivers us the impact factors for
the 2000s.35 For the 1950s we were not able to find a journal ranking and thus decided
to extrapolate our 1960s ranking back to articles published in the 1950s. In total, we
collect impact factors of 74 ranked journals in economics, business and finance for five
decades. Table 6Ranking of journals in different decades.table.caption.17 provides an
overview of the dynamic ranking of the top forty journals used in this study.
The outcome measure in Table 6Ranking of journals in different decades.table.caption.17
is denominated in publication points. The best journal in each decade receives 100
points and all others are scaled accordingly. For example, in the 1960s, a single-
authored Econometrica article is worth 46.6 points while it is worth 96.8 points in
35“IDEAS/RePEc Recursive Discounted Impact Factors for Journals,” last accessed 2011-02-07,
http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html. Note, that this ranking is up-
dated continuously and thus its online version at the time of reading is not exactly the same as the
one we use.
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the 1990s. The impact of the American Economic Review (AER) changed even more
dramatically: It has been the leading journal in the 1960s and 1990s with 93.3 and
100 respectively. In contrast, in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s it was “only” a top tier
journal with 30-40 publication points. Consequently, when trying to interpret our re-
sults above in terms of actual papers, we need to mention the journal and the decade
(e.g. “one third of an AER article in the 1990s”).
Reassuringly, we show in section C.1Alternative Measures for Productivitysubsection.1.C.1
that our results are extremely robust to using several other intuitive productivity mea-
sures: publication points assigned according to the currently very popular h-index,
raw counts of articles written, and, most notably, counts of articles in the five top
economics journals (as in Oyer 2006) plus the Journal of Finance.
B.5 Imputing the PhD Entry Date
As mentioned in section 3.3Macro Data and PhD Entry Datesubsection.3.3, we have
to impute the approximate application date to the PhD.
According to Table 7Duration of a PhDtable.caption.18, the median duration of
a PhD stayed almost constant around five to six years since the 1970s. We therefore
subtract six years from the graduation date and then use the change in the unemploy-
ment rate during the preceding year as an indicator for the state of the macroeconomy
at application.
For example, if a hypothetical graduate student obtained his doctorate in 2009,
he is likely to have started the program either in August 2003 or August 2004 and
must have applied either in the fall of 2002 or 2003. Consequently, we proxy the
change in the outside option at application for a student who graduates in 2009 with
the change in the unemployment rate from summer 2002 to summer 2003.36
36Of course, we cannot be sure that the median number of years is a good measure for the duration
of the PhD for the considered graduate. There is micro data on the duration available with the
National Science Foundation Survey of earned doctorates but access is limited to on site use.
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Table 6: Ranking of journals in different decades.
Rank Journal (ordered by 2000 rank) 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 65.6 16.2 41.6 58.1 100
2 Econometrica 46.6 31.6 78.4 96.8 68.7
3 Journal of Economic Literature - 100 100 18.8 63.5
4 The Review of Economic Studies 100 30.7 40.7 45.2 54.3
5 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity - 96.9 15.9 0.7 51.5
6 The Journal of Political Economy 63.5 59.1 63 65.2 49.8
7 Economic Policy - - - - 45.7
8 Journal of Labor Economics - - 15.4 12.8 45.5
9 The American Economic Review 93.3 34.5 40.2 100 39.9
10 The Journal of Economic Perspectives - - 23.3 34.3 39.8
11 The Review of Financial Studies - - - - 39.2
12 Journal of the European Economic Association - - - - 38.6
13 The RAND Journal of Economics (Bell Journal
of Economics)
- 39.5 40.2 11.4 38.2
14 The Journal of Finance 37.8 14.6 34.1 34.1 31.1
15 The Review of Economics and Statistics 59.8 12.4 6.5 28 21.7
16 Journal of Business & Economic Statistics - - 7.9 38.4 20.8
17 The Economic Journal 47.5 28 23.9 20.7 20.5
18 Journal of Applied Econometrics - - - 16.6 19.1
19 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 18.5 22.1 18.6 18.6
20 The World Bank Economic Review - - - 5.7 18.5
21 International Economic Review 35.1 19 12.3 23 18.4
22 IMF Staff Papers - - - 5.1 18.3
23 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization - - - 4.1 16.1
24 Journal of Law and Economics 51.8 43.3 33.1 3.9 14.1
25 The Journal of Human Resources - 13.6 4.6 21.3 13.4
26 Journal of Population Economics - - - 2.41 10.6
27 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2.5 7.1 2.1 10.7 9.2
28 The Journal of Business 18.5 37.4 8.7 8.7
29 The Journal of Industrial Economics 14.9 16.4 16 3.85 8.7
30 The World Bank Research Observer - - - 0.9 8.5
31 The Journal of Financial and Quant. Analysis - 10.8 20 2.1 7.9
32 Oxford Economic Papers 35.2 16.8 25 3.7 7.9
33 Economica 20.7 36.2 4.1 4.5 7.2
34 Economic Theory - - - 22.4 6.8
35 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 17 18.8 23.4 - 6.1
36 Econometric Theory - - 3.3 45.8 5.9
37 The Canadian Journal of Economics - 11.8 10.2 5.09 5.6
38 The Journal of Legal Studies - - 51.6 5.4 5.4
39 Financial Management - - - - 5.1
40 Journal of Accounting Research - - - - 4.2
Note: These are the first 40 out of 74 journals. The rankings for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s are
taken from Laband and Piette (1994) and the ranking for the 1990s is from Kalaitzidakis,
Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003). For the 2000s, we normalize the current discounted recursive
impact factors ranking from the IDEAS RePEc website
(http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html, last accessed 2011-02-07) to
make it comparable to the other rankings.
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Table 7: Duration of a PhD
Year 1977 1986 1996 1997 2001
5.7 6.3 5.3 5.25 5.5
Median years
of registered
time to PhD
Median years
of registered
time to PhD
Time
to degree
median time-
to-degree
Time
to degree
Source Hansen
(1991)
Hansen
(1991)
NSF* Stock and
Siegfried
(2006)
NSF*
*NSF duration data includes masters degrees, therefore we subtract 1.5 years.
C Robustness Checks
In this section we show that our results are robust when we use several different
measurement concepts for publication productivity. We also consider the subsample
of the graduates from the elite tier one institutions.
We restate our main findings in Table 8Main regression resultstable.caption.19:
A recession at application leads to a more productive selection of academics (column
3). The propensity to become an academic is decreasing with unemployment change
at application and increasing with unemployment change at graduation (column 2).
Cohorts graduating in a recession are publishing more (column 1).
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.540∗∗ -0.891 3.274∗∗∗
(0.661) (0.576) (0.945)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.312∗∗∗ 1.354∗∗ 2.738∗∗
(0.645) (0.607) (1.199)
Subsample All All Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 8: Main regression results
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C.1 Alternative Measures for Productivity
One might be concerned that our dynamic productivity measure does not properly
capture the actual achievements of an academic. We consider three alternative mea-
sures of academic productivity in Tables 9Alternative productivity measures - Full
sampletable.caption.20 and 10Alternative productivity measures - Academicstable.caption.21:
the number of top journal articles, the h-value and the raw number of articles. We
classify articles in the “Econometrica”, “The American Economic Review”, “The
Quarterly Journal of Economics”, “The Review of Economic Studies”, “The Journal
of Political Economy” and “The Journal of Finance” as top journal articles. The
h-index (Hirsch index or Hirsch number) is a currently very popular measure based
on citations and number of articles. An economist has index h if h of his N papers
have at least h citations each, and the other N - h papers have at most h citations
each. The last measure is the raw number of articles written as recorded in JSTOR.
Top Journals h-index # of Articles
Unempl Change (Application) 0.016 1.172 0.012
(0.010) (1.110) (0.032)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.040∗∗∗ 3.980∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.009) (0.869) (0.022)
Subsample All All All
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1068
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 9: Alternative productivity measures - Full sample
All results in Tables 9Alternative productivity measures - Full sampletable.caption.20
and 10Alternative productivity measures - Academicstable.caption.21 point in the
same direction as the dynamic performance measure in the main text and as the
selection theory predicts. Out of the effects predicted by the theory, only the effect
of the unemployment change at application on the number of articles of academics
is not significant. Thus, our results are robust to the use of different productivity
measures.
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Top Journals h-index # of Articles
Unempl Change (Application) 0.035∗∗ 3.161∗∗ 0.057
(0.014) (1.558) (0.047)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.050∗∗∗ 4.838∗∗∗ 0.047
(0.014) (1.552) (0.044)
Subsample Academic Academic Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1047 1047 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10: Alternative productivity measures - Academics
C.2 The Tier 1 Subsample
We also consider the subsample of economists who graduated from the elite tier 1
schools and repeat all our regressions for these highly skilled individuals. According
to Table 11Main regression results (Tier 1)table.caption.22, the magnitude of the
effects appears to be larger in all considered dimensions. With regard to productivity,
the estimates are significant on conventional levels. The only exception is the effect
of unemployment change on productivity at graduation, which is insignificant but
correctly directed. The effect at application and at graduation on the propensity to
become an academic for our preferred measure is strong and highly significant. If we
consider the two alternative measures of being an academic, the result is weaker, not
significant, but in the correct direction (see Table 12Alternative measures for being
an academic (Tier 1)table.caption.23).
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 5.394∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗ 9.864∗∗∗
(2.123) (0.579) (2.935)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 4.347∗ 2.866∗∗∗ 3.969
(2.385) (0.938) (3.449)
Subsample Tier 1 Tier 1 Academic Tier 1
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 234 234 232
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 11: Main regression results (Tier 1)
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Academic Faculty Publish
Unempl Change (Application) -1.716∗∗∗ -0.080 -1.276
(0.579) (0.822) (0.881)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.866∗∗∗ 0.719 0.532
(0.938) (0.474) (0.786)
Subsample Tier 1 Tier 1 Tier 1
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 234 234 234
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12: Alternative measures for being an academic (Tier 1)
D The Relationship Between (Potentially) Con-
founding Factors and the Business Cycle
This section addresses potential concerns about factors that might confound our
results and analyzes possible impacts on our estimates. In the following we address
concerns about the size of the entry and exit cohort, the attrition rate and the timing
of graduation. Lastly, we adress a potential correlation of the business cycle at
application and graduation.
In order to do this, we calculate the number of graduates from our dataset (in the
following listed as “# of graduates (AEA)”) and match it with the unemployment
change at application and at graduation. Then, we supplement this data with data
from the National Science Foundation’s “Survey of Earned Doctorates”.37 From there
we obtain the the number of PhD entrants and graduates for our top 30 universities
since 1977. Using this data, we are able to estimate the attrition (dropout) rate of
each cohort as the difference of the number of entrants minus graduates divided by
the number of entrants. We report the partial correlation coefficient of unemployment
change at application and at graduation with application and graduation numbers in
37This survey is publicly available through the WebCASPAR Interface: “WebCASPAR Integrated
Science and Engineering Resource Data System - NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates/Doctorate
Records File,” National Science Foundation, last accessed 2011-02-08, https://webcaspar.nsf.
gov/.
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Table 13Correlation of unemployment change with attrition, the number of entrants
and graduates (year level)table.caption.24. In order to obtain the correct standard
errors we aggregate the data to yearly averages.
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The first concern one might have is that the number of students admitted to
the PhD systematically increases (decreases) in recessions. Within the framework of
our model, this would weaken (strengthen) the selection effect at application. The
estimated coefficient of unemployment change at application might then be underes-
timated (overestimated). According to Table 13Correlation of unemployment change
with attrition, the number of entrants and graduates (year level)table.caption.24,
we cannot reject that the relation of the number of entrants to the PhD and the
change in unemployment differs from zero on conventional significance levels (p-
value of 67.5%). In Figure 10Number of graduates and unemployment change at
applicationfigure.caption.25 the number of graduates in our data and the unemploy-
ment change at application are depicted.
−
50
0
50
10
0
Un
em
pl
 C
ha
ng
e 
Ap
pl
ica
tio
n
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
Ph
D
 G
ra
du
at
es
 (A
EA
 Li
st)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Graduation Year
PhD Graduates (AEA List) Unempl Change Application
Figure 10: Number of graduates and unemployment change at application
Second, one might be concerned that the attrition (or dropout) rate during the
program may systematically differ between recession and boom cohorts. On the one
hand, some business-inclined individuals who entered the PhD in order to bridge a
recession might return to the private sector before they actually obtain the PhD. If
this were the case, we would underestimate the effect of unemployment change at
application on economists’ career decision after the PhD (the “academic” variable).
The reason is that many of those who would want to switch would have already
done so before we consider them in our population of graduates. On the other hand,
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there might be a higher dropout rate for the boom cohort because its individuals
are of lower academic quality. In this case, our parameters would underestimate the
effect of unemployment change at application on the performance of graduates and
academics. According to the correlation Table 13Correlation of unemployment change
with attrition, the number of entrants and graduates (year level)table.caption.24, our
estimate of the attrition rate is not significantly correlated with unemployment change
at application or graduation.
Third, PhDs might time their graduation in order to circumvent entering the
private or the academic job market during a time of recession.38 The effect of such
a graduation timing on our parameter estimates would depend on whether the high-
or the low skilled bring their graduation date forward (or delay it). For example,
if in a recession students with low academic talent delay their end of the PhD, we
overestimate the effect on productivity at graduation, but underestimate the effect
on becoming an academic. This would attenuate our effect of the business cycle
on productivity at application. Table 13Correlation of unemployment change with
attrition, the number of entrants and graduates (year level)table.caption.24 reports
the correlation of graduation numbers and unemployment change according to the
NSF data and the AEA doctoral listings, respectively. Reassuringly, graduation
numbers seem not to be at all related to the state of the business cycle.
Finally, a last concern might be that, contrary to our assumption in the model,
the business cycle is systematically correlated with itself in the six years between a co-
hort’s application and graduation. Table 14Correlation of unemployment change and
GDP change at application and at graduation (university-year level)table.caption.26
reports this and the contemporaneous correlation between the unemployment change
and GDP growth. Unsurprisingly both measures are strongly contemporaneously re-
lated. However, there is no significant correlation, neither of unemployment change
nor GDP change, between the time of application and graduation. If at all, there may
be a very slightly reversing relationship over the six years. This could imply that we
potentially underestimate the effect of the business cycle on academic performance
38Oyer (2006) documents that also academic job offers decline during recession.
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because a recession cohort at graduation is more likely a boom cohort at application
(and thus is inherently not as able) and vice versa for a boom cohort at graduation.
For the same reason we might in this case overestimate the effect of the business cycle
on the career decision (i.e. the academic variable) at application and at graduation.
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E Supporting Evidence for the Selection Channel
In the theory section of the main text, we hypothesize that during downturns more
individuals want to enter academia and, due to a fixed number of open spaces at
entry to the PhD, only a favorable selection with superior ability is admitted. Unfor-
tunately, however, we see ourselves unable to provide direct evidence for the selection
mechanism at work. This is for the following reason:
In order to gather evidence, we were looking for data that provides observable
ex ante characteristics of the students admitted to the PhD programs which we
could then relate to the state of the business cycle. We obtained Graduate Record
Examination (GRE) scores for a non-US PhD program that is comparable to a tier
two school. The GRE consists of three sections: quantitative, verbal and analytical
writing. In all universities, GRE scores are considered an obligatory part of the
application documents and it is generally agreed that it is almost exclusively the
quantitative section that matters for admission. For this reason, our GRE scores
proved to be uninformative. We found that, independently of the state of the business
cycle, virtually everyone accepted to the PhD as well as most applicants had the
highest possible mark (800 points) in the quantitative section.
In general, we are very skeptical that easily observable ex ante characteristics, such
as GRE data or undergraduate GPAs, of applicants or entrants would be informative
about the selection into the programs because many successful and unsuccessful ap-
plicants do not differ in these dimensions. The truly informative quality differences
of applicants and entrants are most likely to be more subtly hidden in “softer” infor-
mation such as reference letters, research assistantships and types of courses taken
during the undergraduate degree. This kind of information is very hard to obtain
and to process in an objective way.
Although we are unable to present direct evidence for our hypothesized channel,
Kelly Bedard and Douglas Herman published a study in the Economics of Education
Review (2008) that documents supporting evidence for our main selection channel.
They use data on recently graduated science and engineering Bachelor and Master
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students from 1990 to 2000 which is provided in the 1993 to 2001 National Sur-
vey of Recent College Graduates (NSRCG). Exploiting the variation in state-level
unemployment rates, Bedard and Herman find that male PhD enrollment is counter-
cyclical and the counter-cyclicality is driven by students with a high GPA in the
hard sciences.39 They state that the unemployment rate responses for this group
are fairly precisely estimated and that their estimates imply a one-percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate increases “high GPA” male Ph.D. enrollment by
0.356 percentage points.
In another paper, Fougere and Pouget (2003) find that the applications per spaces
ratio in the French public sector rises strongly in economically hard times. Unfortu-
nately they do not provide a quality measure of French public sector workers.
F Further Robustness Checks
We restate our main findings in Table 15Main regression resultstable.caption.27: A
recession at application leads to a more productive selection of academics (column
3). The propensity to become an academic is decreasing with unemployment change
at application and increasing with unemployment change at graduation (column 2).
Cohorts graduating in a recession are publishing more (column 1).
In the following we consider NBER recession indicators and GDP growth as al-
ternative measures for the business cycle, time trends as control variables instead of
decade dummies, and different assumed durations for the PhD. In a subsample anal-
ysis we remove “superstar” economists who are exceptionally prolific to show that
the results are not entirely driven by outliers.
39They look at entry into all PhD programs in terms of quality and subject and not our only
the top 30 economics programs. Therefore, quantity constraints at entry to the PhD should matter
much less and it is not surprising that they not only find the expected quality differences of entrants
with respect to the business cycle, but also quantity differences. Moreover, it is also not surprising
that GPAs matter (more strongly) for engineering and science majors and for a broader range of
graduate schools than just the top 30 departments.
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Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.540∗∗ -0.891 3.274∗∗∗
(0.661) (0.576) (0.945)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.312∗∗∗ 1.354∗∗ 2.738∗∗
(0.645) (0.607) (1.199)
Subsample All All Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15: Main regression results
F.1 Alternative Measures for the Business Cycle and Con-
trols for the Time Trend
Rec Indic Unem Level Unem Change GDP Level GDP Growth
Rec Indic 1.000
Unem Level 0.375∗∗ 1.000
(0.010)
Unem Change 0.619∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 1.000
(0.000) (0.021)
GDP Level -0.109 0.512∗∗∗ -0.085 1.000
(0.470) (0.000) (0.573)
GDP Growth -0.393∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗ -0.869∗∗∗ -0.133 1.000
(0.007) (0.025) (0.000) (0.377)
Observations 46
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 16: Correlation of unemployment change and GDP change at application and
at graduation (university-year level)
Table 16Correlation of unemployment change and GDP change at application and
at graduation (university-year level)table.caption.28 reports the correlations between
potential measures of the business cycle over our sample period including the dates
at application and at graduation from the PhD. The NBER recession indicators are
most strongly related to the change in unemployment and GDP growth. We thus
repeat our main specification with NBER recession indicators and GDP growth as a
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Productivity Academic Productivity
Recession Indicators (Application) 2.163 -3.240∗∗ 5.378∗
(2.108) (1.548) (2.934)
Recession Indicators (Graduation) 4.563∗∗ 2.149 5.094
(2.140) (1.289) (3.568)
Subsample All All Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 17: Alternative business cycle measures: Recession Indicators
Academic Faculty Publish Academic
Recession Indicators (Application) -3.240∗∗ -1.415 -1.791 -5.734∗∗∗
(1.548) (1.061) (1.198) (1.727)
Recession Indicators (Graduation) 2.149 1.839∗∗ 1.138 3.946∗∗
(1.289) (0.760) (0.836) (1.675)
Subsample All All All Tier 1
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1068 234
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 18: Alternative business cycle measures: Recession Indicators
Productivity Academic Productivity
GDP Change (Application) -0.658∗∗ 0.472∗ -1.456∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.245) (0.421)
GDP Change (Graduation) -0.705∗∗ -0.407 -0.739
(0.326) (0.273) (0.557)
Subsample All All Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 19: Alternative business cycle measures: GDP change
measure for the business cycle in Tables 17Alternative business cycle measures: Re-
cession Indicatorstable.caption.29 and 19Alternative business cycle measures: GDP
changetable.caption.31.40 The results for the recession indicators are qualitatively
40The growth of GDP might well proxy for a (potential) economist’s earnings potential in outside
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Academic Faculty Publish Academic
GDP Change (Application) 0.472∗ 0.248 0.448∗∗ 0.750∗∗
(0.245) (0.194) (0.189) (0.287)
GDP Change (Graduation) -0.407 -0.047 0.051 -1.247∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.193) (0.229) (0.361)
Subsample All All All Tier 1
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1068 234
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 20: Alternative business cycle measures: GDP change
the same as in our main regressions and they are significant for three out of the four
predictions of the model. This is reassuring. Note that an increase in GDP indicates
a boom and a decrease a recession. Therefore, the sign of the coefficients are reversed.
The results on productivity hold up very well: the effect of unemployment change
at application as well as at graduation are not only in the direction that the theory
predicts but also significant. The direction of the coefficients is also correct in the
regressions with alternative interpretations of being an academic (Tables 18Alterna-
tive business cycle measures: Recession Indicatorstable.caption.30 and 20Alternative
business cycle measures: GDP changetable.caption.32).
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.873∗∗ -0.942∗ 3.555∗∗∗
(0.723) (0.534) (1.013)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 1.551∗∗ 0.635 1.736
(0.649) (0.582) (1.169)
Subsample All All Academic
Time trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 21: Alternative controls: linear and quadratic time trend
Another concern might be that our graduation decade dummies inadequately con-
trol for the general trends in academia over time. In Table 21Alternative controls:
employment with performance pay such as the financial sector.
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Academic Faculty Publish Academic
Unempl Change (Application) -0.942∗ -0.083 -0.501 -1.214∗
(0.534) (0.393) (0.318) (0.637)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.635 0.025 0.044 1.493
(0.582) (0.418) (0.460) (0.905)
Subsample All All All Tier 1
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047 232
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 22: Alternative controls: linear and quadratic time trend
linear and quadratic time trendtable.caption.33 we therefore report the main regres-
sion with university dummies and a linear and quadratic time trend instead. The
results of the main section on productivity are largely robust. Only the productivity of
academics at graduation is not significant anymore, but theory made no prediction for
the signs of this parameter in the first place. The results on the propensity to become
an academic have the right sign and at application they are significant at the 10%
level. The picture stays the same if we use different measures for being an academic
in Table 22Alternative controls: linear and quadratic time trendtable.caption.34.
F.2 Alternative Measures for Being an Academic
In the main text, we report three different measures which might indicate that an
individual is an academic: Our standard “academic” measure equals one if he is a
faculty member or a member of the American Economic Association after graduation
from the PhD. The second measure is one if the PhD student becomes a faculty mem-
ber at a US business, economics or finance department and the third one shows if the
student is able to publish in one of our ranked journals after graduation. In the main
text, due to conciseness, we left out the robustness of our productivity regressions
of academics with regard to the last two measures. In Table 23Alternative measure
for being an academic: Productivitytable.caption.35, we report this robustness check
for completeness. All coefficients have the correct sign and they are significant at
conventional levels (except the unemployment change at graduation for the faculty
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measure).
Productivity Productivity Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 3.274∗∗∗ 6.837∗∗∗ 5.630∗∗∗
(0.945) (2.471) (1.291)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.738∗∗ 2.353 4.352∗∗∗
(1.199) (1.868) (1.094)
Subsample Academic Faculty Publish
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1047 906 974
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 23: Alternative measure for being an academic: Productivity
F.3 Alternative Duration of the PhD
We explain in our data section that we impute the application date by subtracting six
years from the graduation date. The rationale for the difference of 6 years is explained
in section B.5Imputing the PhD Entry Datesubsection.1.B.5 in the appendix. In
Tables 24Alternative duration of PhD (5 Years)table.caption.36 and 25Alternative
duration of PhD (7 Years)table.caption.37, we change the duration of the PhD to 5
and 7 years, respectively.
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) -0.648 -0.502 -0.609
(0.659) (0.584) (1.035)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.220∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗ 2.502∗
(0.738) (0.603) (1.359)
Subsample All All All
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 24: Alternative duration of PhD (5 Years)
The effect at graduation stays the same, of course, but the effect at application
all but vanishes. We interpret this as a support for our argument of an estimated
60
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) -0.325 -0.853 -0.420
(0.730) (0.528) (1.275)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.200∗∗∗ 1.467∗∗ 2.502∗
(0.661) (0.599) (1.287)
Subsample All All Academic
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 25: Alternative duration of PhD (7 Years)
difference of 6 years between application and graduation.
F.4 Exclusion of Superstar-Economists
Finally, we want to make sure that our results are not driven by the exceptional
performance of very few superstar-economists whose extraordinary talent would have
made them academics independently of any state of the business cycle.
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Figure 11: The publication distribution
First, consider in Figure 11The publication distributionfigure.caption.38 the dis-
tribution of individuals’ publication success as a histogram and over time. The modus
and the median of the distribution of publications is zero while the mean is 31.49.
Only 80 economists achieve more than 500 publication points with Nobel laureate
Joseph Stiglitz scoring a stunning maximum of 1738 points. In Table 26Main re-
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gression results “ex superstars”table.caption.39, we report the results of our main
regressions if we remove the 80 economists who publish more than 500 points. We
see that our main results are not driven by these “outliers”.
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.048 -0.008 2.358∗∗
(0.628) (0.006) (0.875)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 1.508∗∗ 0.010 1.835∗
(0.559) (0.006) (1.010)
Subsample w/o Superstars w/o Superstars Academic w/o superstars
Univ-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 26: Main regression results “ex superstars”
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